

HISTORY

of the

244th Combat Information Systems Squadron

unit designation

Portland International Airport, OR 97218

location

for the period

1 July 1985

through

30 Sept 1985

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 SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS	

CHRONOLOGY

1	July	Unit Name Redesignated
7-10	July	Forest Fire Communications Support
13-14	July	Unit Training Assembly
25-28	July	Forest Fire Communications Support
3-4	Aug	Unit Training Assembly
3-18	Aug	Annual Field Training
8-10	Aug	Practice Operational Readiness Inspection
14-15	Sept	Unit Training Assembly
14	Sept	Key NCO Staff Meeting
14	Sept	Major Wilson Retires
14	Sept	BGen Sams Retirement Ceremony-Base Parade

I.

REQUIRED DATA

1. UNIT AND LOCATION

244th Combat Information Systems Squadron
Portland International Airport, OR
97218-2797

2. NAME AND GRADE OF COMMANDER

KEITH E. HALLMARK, Lt Col, ORANG

3. CHAIN OF COMMAND (See ANGR 210-1, Attachment 1)

National Guard Bureau	Air Force
Adjutant General, State of Oregon	Air Force Communications Command
244th Combat Information Systems Squadron	Tactical Information Systems Division
	252nd Combat Information Systems Gp
	244th Combat Information Systems Sq

4. SUBORDINATE UNITS (See ANGR 210-1, Attachment 1)

None

5. MISSION (Give authority and brief statement of primary mission)

NGB letter dated 26 Mar 76, Military Peacetime Mission: Organize, train, man & equip to attain & maintain optimum effective capability to carry out roles and tasks assigned by gaining command plans for utilization in the event of national emergency. State of Oregon Peacetime Mission: Provide organized & trained personnel for preservation of life & property and maintenance of order & public safety whenever required and so directed. Mobilization: Provide those organized and trained communications elements for the purpose of conducting operations support.

6. PERSONNEL

	OFFICERS	AIRMEN	TECHNICIANS		CIVILIANS	
			CIV SUS	MIL, T-32	FEDERAL	STATE
AUTHORIZED	9	180	17	3		
ASSIGNED	8	175	17	3		

7. EQUIPMENT (Give official nomenclature and quantity of mission-type equipment)

1-TYC 8 DSTE	5-TRC 36 Radio Sets (UHF/VHF Wideband Relay)
1-TTC 22 Switchboard	3-TRC 61 Radio Sets (UHF/VHF Wideband Terminal)
1-TGC 20 Comm Center	4-FRC 153 Radio Sets (HF Command & Control)
1-MSB 22B Tech Control	47-Trailers
1-Radio Ops Van	
1-Comm Focal Point	
38-Power Units	
64-Motorized Vehicles	
1-TSC 15 HF Comm Central	
1-TSC 60V4 HF Comm Central	
2-TRC 97D Radio Sets (Wideband)	

This part should contain significant information relating to your unit's mission performance. Some basic subjects to include are: (1) operations and training; (2) changes to primary equipment such as radars, aircraft, etc.; (3) equipment performance; (4) facilities; (5) maintenance and supply problems; (6) manpower matters affecting the mission; (7) status of funds; (8) other subjects bearing on mission performance. See ANGR 210-1 for additional guidance.

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

On 1 July 1985 our unit was redesignated as the 244th Combat Information Systems Squadron (CISS), with no change in station, authorized strength or gaining command.¹

The 13-14 July Unit Training Assembly (UTA) was an 8 hour operational UTA. An in-ranks inspection, Commander's Call and Social Actions/Drug and Alcohol Abuse Training class was accomplished on 13 July. Training was provided in the proper operation and maintenance of mission equipment.²

The 3-4 August Unit Training Assembly was used in conjunction with Annual Field Training (AFT) to conduct a practice Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI). Specifically, these two days were used for an Initial Air Response Mobility Exercise in which Unit Type Code team chiefs and members prepared individual UTC packages for a simulated air mobile configuration.³ This effort went very well.⁴

Annual Field Training started on 5 August with the unit converting the UTC packages prepared on 3-4 August to road mobility configuration. Three convoys deployed to Camp Rilea and packages were sent to four remote sites.⁵ See Supporting Document 4 for details. During 8-10 August our unit linked with the 256th Combat Information Systems Squadron for three days for a practice Operational Readiness Inspection.⁶ We were inspected by Detachment 4, 1816 Reserve Advisor Squadron (LtCol Bonjourni and four Air Force Advisors) plus five persons selected from among our unit's quality control inspectors.⁷ The ORI was conducted to provide a realistic training opportunity for inexperienced personnel. Some areas needing improvement were identified but overall achievement was commendable.⁸ See Supporting Document 3, attachments 2-1 through 2-10 for details.

The 14-15 September Unit Training Assembly was a commander's option, 8 hour UTA. It was used to conduct communications operations and maintenance training. Also, the entire unit participated in a base parade honoring the retirement of Brig. Gen. Charles A. Sams, Commander, Oregon Air National Guard.⁹

MANPOWER

Major Lawrence E. Wilson, Chief of Maintenance, retired on 12 July 85 after more than 22 years of service. He was replaced as Chief of Maintenance by Major Larry M. Kribs, formerly our Mobility Officer.

SMSgt Ramon Gonzalez, Vehicle Maintenance Superindendent, transferred to the 142nd Fighter Interceptor Group to become their Consolidated Base Motor Pool Superintendent. He was replaced by MSgt J. Haneline, who was Vehicle Maintenance Superintendent for the 244th Combat Information Systems Flight.

OTHER

The 244th CISS has a cooperative agreement with Mount Hood National Forest Service to provide communications support for forest fire operations. On 7 Jul 85 we were requested to provide communications for a fire operation in the Mount Hood National Forest (Code named June Bug). We deployed four wideband radio teams involving fifteen air technicians. The mission was completed on 10 July 85.¹⁰ On 25 Jul 85 we were again asked to support a forest fire operation, this time in an area east of Estacada in the vicinity of the north fork of the Clackamas River (Code named Bozo). Four wideband radio teams involving fifteen air technicians were deployed. The mission was terminated on 28 July 85.¹¹

(Continue on blank sheets, size 8 1/2 X 11, numbered and securely attached hereto.)

PREPARED BY (Typed name and grade of Historian)

CRAIG W. HOVEY, MSgt, ORANG

APPROVED BY (Typed name and grade of Commander)

KEITH E. HALLMARK, LtCol, ORANG

SIGNATURE

Craig W. Hovey

SIGNATURE

Keith E. Hallmark

FOOTNOTES

1. Special Order G-75, 10 June 85
2. After Action Report, 16 July 85
3. After Action Report, 30 Aug 85
4. Ibid., Attachment 1
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid. and Attachment 2-1
8. Ibid.
9. After Action Report, 18 Sept 85
10. Ltr, State Active Duty Status-Forest Fire Support, 8 Jul 85
11. Ltr, State Active Duty Status-Forest Fire Support, 26 Jul 85

LINEAGE AND HONORS DATA

Unit Designation: 244 Combat Information Systems Squadron
Previous Designation: 244 Combat Communications Squadron
Authority: 10 June 1985, S.O. #G-75 (OTAG, OR State)
Station: Portland International Airport, OR 97218-2797
Unit Awards: None this quarter.



5

244TH MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS SQUADRON (CONTINGENCY)

(NOTE: Redesignated 244th Combat Information Systems Squadron)

ORGANIZATIONAL EMBLEM: 244TH MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS SQUADRON (CONTINGENCY)

SIGNIFICANCE: The emblem is symbolic of the Squadron. The globe on the blue background denotes aerospace communications, and half in daylight, the other half in darkness, symbolizes time. The lightning flash links day and night and extends the dimensions of the world and beyond. The flash also denotes rapidity of action when called upon for the defense of our country.

MOTTO: DIC QUANDO ET UBI - Say When and Where

DESCRIPTION: On a light blue disc edged yellow a sphere with axis pale-wise, the dexter half yellow grid lined black, the sinister half black grid lined yellow, overall in bend a red lightning flash. Attached above the disc a blank white scroll edged yellow. Attached below the disc a white scroll edged yellow and inscribed "Dic Quando Et Ubi" in black letters.

30 Sept 85


244 Combat Information Systems Squadron Key Personnel

*Lt Col Keith E. Hallmark	Commander
Major Jon V. French	Chief of Operations
Capt Alvin H. Baker	Communications Operations Officer
*CMSgt Ronald M. Lamberton	CEM Communications Operations
MSgt Seibert T. Root Jr.	NCOIC Radio Operations
TSgt Randy L. Bray	NCOIC Technical Control
Major Larry M. Kribs	Chief of Maintenance
Major Ivan J. Coykendall	Supply Operations Officer
Major Thomas W. Dufresne	Mobility Officer
2Lt Steven W. Miller	Communications Maintenance Officer
2Lt Patrick T. Judge	Communications Maintenance Officer
*CMSgt Leonard W. Norby	CEM Maintenance
*SMSgt Joseph J. Buxton	Radio Maintenance Superintendent
*SMSgt Richard P. DeMars	NCOIC Maintenance Control
*MSgt David A. Dowiasz	NCOIC Wire Maintenance
*MSgt Robert H. Kehler	NCOIC Wideband Radio Maintenance
*MSgt S. Parzy Rose III	NCOIC Power Production Maintenance
*MSgt T. Haneline Jr.	NCOIC Vehicle Maintenance
*TSgt James W. Gotcher	NCOIC Quality Control
*TSgt Dale C. Matheny	NCOIC Materiel Control
MSgt John T. Dryden	First Sergeant
*MSgt Craig W. Hovey	NCOIC Admin/Personnel
*TSgt Debra M. Johnson	Unit Training Technician
MSgt Michael Kassin	Air Force Technical Advisor
TSgt Michael Trusty	Air Force Technical Advisor

* - Full Time Technician

244 CISS Air Technician Organization Chart and Alert System

AS OF: 18 Sep 85



SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

1. Special Order G-75, 10 June 85
2. After Action Report, 16 Jul 85
3. After Action Report, with Attachs., 30 Aug 85
4. Ltr, 244 CISS Mobility Exercise, 26 Aug 85
5. After Action Report, 18 Sept 85
6. Ltr, State Active Duty Status, 8 Jul 85
7. Ltr, State Active Duty Status, 26 Jul 85

MILITARY DEPARTMENT
STATE OF OREGON
2150 Fairgrounds Road NE
Salem, Oregon 97303-3241

SPECIAL ORDERS
NUMBER G-75

10 June 1985

1. The following units, Oregon Air National Guard, Portland IAP, Portland, OR are redesignated as indicated below with no change in station, authorized strength or gaining command, effective 1 Jul 85. Authority: ANGR 26-2 and Ltr, ANGSC/MPM, 30 May 85, Subject: Redesignation of Combat Communications Units; Ltr, ANGSC/MPM, 29 May 85, Subject: Redesignation of Communications Flights (Support); Ltr, ANGSC/MPM, 12 Jun 85, Redesignation of Civil Engineering Flights.

<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>
244th Combat Communications Squadron/ 244 CMBTCS	244 Combat Information Systems Squadron/ 244 CISS
244 Combat Communications Flight/ 244 CMBTCF	244 Combat Information Systems Flight/ 244 CISF
142d Communications Flight (Spt)/142 CF	Information Systems Flight/142 ISF
142d Civil Engineer Flight/142 CEF	142 Civil Engineer Squadron/ 142 CES

2. The following unit, Oregon Air National Guard, Portland IAP, Portland, OR is reorganized/realigned as indicated, effective 1 Jul 85, with no change in gaining command. Authority: ANGR 26-2 and Ltr, ANGSC/MPM, undated, Subject: TAC Control Squadron Review; ANGSC/MPM messages, R111300Z Feb 85 and R032000Z May 85, Subject: TAC Control Squadron Review.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
FROM: 116 Tactical Control Squadron	30	235	265
TO: 116 Tactical Control Squadron	31	257	288

BY ORDER OF THE GOVERNOR:

OFFICIAL:

MARINUS M. OPITZ, Lt Col, ORANG
Executive Support Staff Officer

RICHARD A. MILLER
Major General
The Adjutant General

Distribution: A - Air



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
244 COMBAT COMMUNICATIONS SQUADRON (CONTINGENCY) (ANG)
PORTLAND INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, OREGON 97218 - 2797

Supporting
Document NO. 2

REPLY TO
ATTN OF CC

16 Jul 85

SUBJECT Jul 85 UTA After Action Report

TO 252 CMBTCG/CC

1. General: The 13 & 14 Jul 85 UTA was an 8 hour operational UTA. An in ranks inspection was conducted Saturday morning followed by Commander's Call and Social Actions/Drug and Alcohol Abuse Training.

2. Operations:

a. Accomplishments:

(1) Technical Control Facility: The TCF worked with the 256 CISS TCF to terminate the leased land line, for use by the 256 CISS DSTE and 244 CISS DSTE. No serious problems were encountered.

(2) Switchboard: As the TTC-22 was deployed to Red Flag, our switchboard personnel operated the PANG base switchboard. Over 100 calls were completed. A phone directory for AFT was also completed.

(3) MPF: During Saturday, the MPF processed 14 messages. Sunday 14 messages were completed.

(4) DSTE: No major problems encountered. twenty-one messages were sent, plus service checks and opening/closing notices. Seventeen messages were received. The DSTE team was very satisfied using the leased land line, as there were no prop (HF) problems to contend with, thus down time was almost non-existent (there was 5 minutes of power outage after operations were started).

(5) Radio Operations: Radio Operations worked the Limeade net, working with Limeade 18, 10, Control and 04. Seven messages were sent Saturday, two messages received. Eight messages were sent Sunday, and more received. Propagation was a problem on Sunday, and some stations were on the net for short periods of time. Training was also conducted on KWM-2A set-up and tear-down.

(6) Command Focal Point: The mini CFP was in operation, and in contact with the 256 CISS CFP. We plan to improve the CFP operation by combining the unit Job Control and CFP offices in the near future, possibly by September 85. This office will then operate very similar whether in the field or in garrison.

b. Problems: None

c. Solutions: None

(7) Other: Off-line encryption training was conducted for four persons.

3. Maintenance:

a. Wideband:

(1) Accomplishments:

(a) Briefed all section personnel on Project Headstart wideband system.

(b) Inventoried 9 UTC administrative support kits and replenished with available assets.

(c) Completed 7-level up grade training for 3 personnel.

(d) Performed section semi-annual MOI and Squadron regulation review.

(e) Conducted Team Chief training for 10 UTC packages.

b. HF Maintenance:

(1) Accomplishments:

(a) TSC-60 training, run up, operations, and patching.

(b) Conducted AN/FRC-153 technical inspections.

(c) Tested one person for 7-level AFSC Course Exam.

(2) Problem:

(a) AN/FRC-153 #232 has mic that is open all the time.

(b) Found all AN/FRC-153's had corrosion, probably caused by being stored in bldg. 729.

(3) Solutions: Suggest storing AN/FRC-153 in bldg. 1333 where it is heated.

c. Power Production:

(1) Accomplishments:

(a) AN/TRC-61 #498 Air Conditioner replaced compressor.

(b) AN/FRC-61 A/C #235 trouble shot, Thermostat on order.

(c) AN/TRC A/C #482 adjusted-check ok.

(d) Trained personnel on proper procedures and performed PMI on MB-5.

(e) Conducted classes on proper procedures for drawing WRSK and the starting circuit for MB-5's.

d. Materiel Control:

(1) Accomplishments:

- (a) Inventory org code 218 WRSK UTC package.
- (b) Turned in 60 line items excess WRSK.
- (c) Signed out mobility bags to mobility class.
- (d) Inventoried Comm Ops mobility bags.

e. Wire:

(1) Accomplishments:

- (a) Section quarterly Safety briefing completed.
- (b) M-28 ASR #799 printer line feed problem corrected.
- (c) Six month safety belt inspection completed.
- (d) All TA-312 and TA-236 telephone op checked and cleared.
- (e) 14 each 407L cables op checked.
- (f) 2 each 407L cables repaired.
- (g) Plastic defusers installed on crypto maintenance work bench.
- (h) Cleaned and repaired as needed mobile cable vault van.
- (i) Repaired M-28 LTRs-FIGs shift problem on ASR #796.

f. Quality Control:

(1) Accomplishments:

- (a) Performed 2 technical inspections (one on a KWM2A and one on a UGC-96).
- (b) Accomplished training on performing Technical Inspections - entered in AF Form 623.

(2) Problems: Insufficient time to finish the one KWM2A technical inspection 80% complete.

(3) Solutions: None - can be worked out or Technician will finish during the week.

4. Mobility: The squadron conducted initial mobility training for squadron, flight and 116th ICS personnel.

5. Command:

a. Accomplishments:

(1) Squadron status briefings were conducted daily for the Commander and staff.

(2) Planning sessions for Annual Field Training were held by the Commander and key staff.



KEITH E. HALLMARK, LtCol, ORANG
Commander



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
244 COMBAT COMMUNICATIONS SQUADRON (CONTINGENCY) (ANG)
PORTLAND INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, OREGON 97218 - 2797

Supporting
Document NO. 3

REPLY TO
ATTN OF CC

30 Aug 85

SUBJECT Aug 85 UTA and AFT After Action Report

TO HQ/ORANG/CC - 252 CISC/CC - 252 CISC/DO

1. General: The 244 CISS conducted sixteen days of training, 3 through 18 Aug 1985. Two of the days were in UTA status, the balance Annual Training. The underlying philosophy was to conduct an ORI practice without practicing to be miserable. This report will cover the activities on a daily basis.

a. Days 1 and 2 - UTC team chiefs and team members prepared their individual UTC packages for a simulated Air Mobile configuration.

b. Day 3 - 142 FIG Mobility section hosted the 244 CISS through an outstanding Air Mobility exercise. The results were far better than Major Hehr or I anticipated. A general attitude of cooperation and helpfulness was apparent in both organizations.

c. Day 4 - Converted from Air Mobility posture to Road Mobile configuration. All convoys were formed, Quality Controlled, and safety checked.

d. Day 5 - Mission Briefings followed by three individual convoy movements to Camp Rilea. A site verification Team was deployed early and was in place to pre-position convoy elements on arrival. This activity was followed by a Safety stand-down overnight.

e. Day 6 - 5-Hour, 0700. LtCol Bonjourni plus four Air Force Advisors, aided by five 244 CISS Quality Control Inspectors were on hand to provide a complete and continuous evaluation of 244 CISS efforts to meet ORI criteria. LtCol Bonjourni's report is attachment #2.


f. Day 7 and 8 - These training days were characterized by 12 hour operational shifts operating with the 256 CISS combined with a series of ATSO events conducted by LtCol Bonjourni's team of evaluators.

g. Day 9 - Stand down.

h. Day 10, 11, 12 and 13 - Twenty-four hour a day operation with the 104th Tactical Control Flight who were being evaluated in an Operational Readiness Inspection. During these training days Disaster Preparedness Training plus Range Firing was accomplished for all personnel.

i. Day 14 - Pack-up and return to home station.

j. Day 15 and 16 - Recovery - All equipment cleaned and refueled.
Mobility Warehouse restored to proper order.



KEITH E. HALLMARK, LtCol, ORANG
Commander

2 Atch

1. Summary
2. Overview - Inspection Report

AFTER ACTION SUMMARY

1. ACCOMPLISHMENTS:

a. During the August UTA, an Initial Air Response Mobility exercise was completed. Of the total 18 unit UTC's, 15 UTC's participated in the exercise. The exercise included processing through the host base mobility section. All equipment and personnel for 10 aircraft loads were successfully processed through the host. There were only 5 increments that were frustrated by the host for minor discrepancies, which were quickly corrected by unit personnel. All marshalling times were met well ahead of schedule.

b. During the first day of AFT, the unit converted all packages to a road mobility configuration. This included a CFP package and materiel for a combat support function. Three convoys deployed to Camp Rilea and packages were sent to four remote sites.

c. Our unit linked with the 256 CISS for three days in a practice ORI. All systems and circuits were operational within the required time frames. The 1816 Reserve Advisor Squadron conducted the inspection. Numerous ATSO events including fuel spill, bomb threat, and gas attack were conducted. The overall evaluation was satisfactory. The evaluation report identified several areas for the unit to improve its procedures. The exercise provided the opportunity for the less experienced personnel to gain valuable exposure to an ORI scenario.

d. The unit served as the distant end for the 104th ICF during their ORI for four days. During this period numerous other training activities were conducted. These included Chemical Warfare Defense, Range Firing on the M-16 and .38 caliber pistol (M-16: 72 fired, 56 qualified; .38: 14 fired, 11 qualified), CPR training, and numerous other section training activities.

e. The site was dismantled and all equipment and personnel convoyed back to Portland. All equipment and vehicles were cleaned and staged during the recovery operation.

2. PROBLEMS: Some minor problems were identified during the two week training period. These will be used to improve procedures and identify areas where further training is required.

3. SAFETY: The unit was generally safety conscious throughout the training period. The safety NCO reported some areas where improvement could be made. These items will be brought to the attention of the responsible individuals for correction.

4. CONCLUSION: The two week training period accomplished its assigned objectives. Personnel received additional training on their assigned tasks and are now better prepared to fulfill the 244 CISS mission requirements.

OVERVIEW

I. An Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI) of the 244 Combat Information Squadron, Portland Oregon, was conducted by members of Det 4, 1816 Reserve Advisor Squadron and selected members of the 244 CIS Quality Control function. The ORI was conducted at the 244 CIS deployed location, Camp Rilea, Oregon, during the period 8-10 August, 1985. The inspection was conducted IAW AFR 123-1 and AFCC Supplement 2, Chapter 10. The scope of the inspection included an evaluation of the critical areas identified therein. Major problem areas were included in this report.

II. OVERALL COMMENTS: The ORI was conducted to provide a training vehicle for personnel with little or no experience working in this demanding environment. While the inspection did point to areas which need improvement the overall achievements of the inexperienced personnel is commendable. Personnel demonstrated a very positive and professional attitude during this inspection. It is evident that personnel are preparing to perform their wartime mission. Personnel were highly motivated and demonstrated excellent proficiency in response to bomb threats, attack by a small enemy force (with chemicals), MIJI, and fuel spill exercises. However, inexperience slowed some responses and pointed to areas which require additional training.

III. SPECIFIC COMMENTS

A. OPERATIONS This ORI was an excellent arena for training all operations personnel. All circuits were activated within established time parameters. Operations personnel performed very well considering the overall level of experience available in each facility. Morale in all facilities was high. Access rosters for entry into each facility were not initially available for signing-in Inspection Team Members into the facilities. Additional emphasis is needed in physical security.

1. RADIO OPERATIONS FACILITY (ROF) ROF personnel performed their mission in a professional manner. Their protection of COMSEC material was noteworthy. However, their attention to physical security requires attention. The Inspection Team did not have a fully qualified inspector to fully evaluate the entire performance of the facility. In addition, a complete net was not planned or incorporated into this ORI scenario. These two factors prevented a complete and full evaluation of the facility. But with the limited expertise of the inspection team the following comments are provided.

a. Generally, authentication procedures were noteworthy. However, on one occasion a minor deviation was noted on a Net Control change from the Net Control Station to the 244 CIS ROF.

b. Phone patch procedures. A FLASH phone patch was requested by the Supported Forces CC and not honored by the ROF. Another time a phone patch was requested three times before it was granted. The procedures were excellent when phone patches were

provided by ROF.

c. It was noted that an operator authenticated with the distant end and failed to use the phonetic alphabet.

d. Physical Security of the ROF needs improvement. Numerous times inspectors entered the facility unnoticed and unchallenged. Nor were they signed in on an access roster, AF FORM 1109. These lapses in Physical Security could lead to harmful COMSEC compromises. This area was also an OBSERVATION during the 1984 ORI by the AFCC IG.

2. TELEPHONE OPERATIONS Telephone operations personnel met all mission requirements in a timely and professional manner. They were able to complete all routine and emergency procedures established. Personnel were motivated and enthusiastic. The following are comments provided by the Inspection Team members.

a. The switchboard was left unattended for a short period of time on two different occasions.

b. Job Control procedures were not fully understood or used by the switchboard personnel.

c. An excellent job was done when the switchboard personnel made Conference Calls. The calls were established quickly and accurately.

d. Off-site calls to the local area were processed very well.

3. TELETYPE OPERATIONS Both message processing facilities and the teletype vans were manned with a cadre of competent personnel. The following are comments provided by the Inspection Team members.

a. During set-up, the MPF door was wide open and an inspector entered unseen and unchallenged.

b. During set-up, the TGC-20 door was not locked, outside or inside, and constant observation of the entrance was not maintained.

c. Personnel were uncertain of the proper procedures for circuit activation/acceptance.

d. Personnel were not aware of their job control numbers and reporting procedures for their respective facilities.

e. If facility checklists were available, they were not observed being used.

f. Master Station Logs did not contain all pertinent information concerning their respective facilities.

g. Personnel should be highly commended for their attitude, cooperation, security awareness(after set-up), job knowledge, and professionalism.

h. Personnel were very knowledgeable of the CARA's and procedures which was also noteworthy.

4. TECHNICAL CONTROL FACILITY The facility met all mission requirements in a timely manner. Facility subsystems and system acceptance checks were very thorough. Circuit activations were accomplished and positive circuit/system restoration procedures were used. The personnel working the facility were able to perform the required duties in a proficient and professional manner. The following comments are provided by the Inspection Team members.

a. The Master Station log was not being maintained on a real time basis IAW DCAC 310-70-1. Personnel jotted down events and times on scratch paper and later transcribed that information over to the MSL.

b. DD FORM 1443 was not being used as a tool to track circuit/system outages and problems associated with their restoral. The forms were available in the facility and directions for completing the forms was posted on the wall in a conspicuous place.

c. Two unauthorized personnel (not inspectors) were observed entering and leaving the facility, but their names did not appear on the AF FORM 1109 maintained in the facility.

d. Continuity of operations was not well maintained during a critical activation of a system. The two senior controllers who had been working in the facility went to chow and allowed the two remaining controllers (who had been working outside the facility) to take over the TCF operation. This created a period of time where the two oncoming controllers were more or less "spinning their wheels" until they could come up to speed with the current events in the facility.

e. TCF personnel spent a lot of time (on two occasions) installing their Camo-Netting.

f. No systems diagrams were posted or evident in the facility for ready reference by TCF personnel. DCAC 310-70-1.

g. DD FORM 1441's were not used by the TCF. DCAC 310-70-1.

B. GROUND POWER Sufficient ground power was provided during the entire exercise. Generator failures were rare and back-up power was brought on-line without major communications interruptions. The following are comments provided by the Inspection Team members.

1. Refueling crew's actions during bomb threat ATSO events were clear, correct, fast, and efficient.

2. Two new generators did not have AFTO Form 244's available. They were SER #6418 and #6438.

3. One generator was brought to the field without being fully pre-deployment checked before leaving home station. It was low on oil.

C. WIDEBAND AND HF RADIO MAINTENANCE Set-up and installation of required systems were conducted IAW applicable TO's and directives. Personnel assigned to the facilities were proficient and dedicated to their tasks. Personnel assigned to the TSC-60 were relatively inexperienced but were able to do an outstanding job with their system. The following comments are provided by the Inspection Team members.

1. TRC-97 comments.

a. Assigned personnel performed an on-the-spot correction of their antenna field that was laid out incorrectly by the SVT.

b. Some of the support tools in the toolbox were in poor condition for maintenance of the radio equipment. Stripped out sockets.

* c. A status report was sent to the CFP by the NCOIC reporting Maintenance Ready, but his crew was still working on the waveguide.

d. Team chief at Rilea #2 made a frequency calculation error when setting up his system. He divided, rather than multiplied by 2 when converting from frequencies to channels. This caused approximately two hours of delay for bringing the system up.

e. The facility was not Camo'd correctly. Desert and woodland netting was used, but the Frag. order called for all facilities to be dressed in Woodland.

f. Team chief could have notified CFP sooner about problems his personnel were encountering during system set-up.

g. Team chief relayed operating frequencies over the Tac Radio system.

2. TRC-61 comments.

a. No Tac radios in the van during set-up. Extra radios were available in the CFP. Lack of a Tac radio impeded system alignment.

b. A PSM-6 Voltage Meter had extremely corroded and deteriorated test leads. PMEL #THA-505.

c. Doors to facility were not closed during any ATSO event.

d. Camo netting was not kept at least 2 feet above the top of the facility IAW applicable TO's.

3. TSC-60 comments. No specific comments other than the crew maintaining the facility did an outstanding job installing and maintaining the facility during the exercise.

D. TELEPHONE MAINTENANCE Personnel assigned to this package met all installation requirements ahead of schedule with an enthusiastic attitude. They performed numerous on-site corrections to the Main Distribution Frame Program. They also installed extra telephone drops in addition to requirements set up in the Frag Order. Trainers and Trainees excelled at their tasks during the exercise.

E. COMMAND FOCAL POINT After a bit of stumbling at the beginning, CFP personnel's confidence and abilities increased with job familiarity. Management of the Employment Phase improved as the exercise continued. It was evident that both crews working in the CFP were receiving a lot of valuable training and experience. All personnel were enthusiastic and cooperative. The following comments are provided by the Inspection Team members.

1. Physical security of the CFP area was not as good as it could have been.
2. Inspectors signed into the CFP on the first day, but not thereafter. Some never did sign in but roamed the facility freely without challenge. CFP entry control point was not effective.
3. Master Station Logs maintained by the CFP were lacking items of importance. Items were submitted for insertion in the MSL, but were lost before they could be put in it.
4. Potential TEMPEST violation was allowed to exist for 1 hour. Supported Forces CC's Tac radio was too close to an operational facility.
5. High value intelligence material(not classified) material should have been afforded more protection.
6. Job Control did not have a firm control procedure for establishing and controlling ETRO's(Estimated Time Return to Operation).
7. Job Control personnel should have been more familiar with Wideband and HF systems nomenclature and ID numbers.
8. Essential CFP personnel (not Key personnel) should not have been used as runners during the exercise.
9. TCF personnel called in an activation time of 080124Z on the 9th of August. This time frame went unchallenged until an inspector pointed out the difference.
10. An OPSEC Violation occurred when the location and frequencies used for the TRC-97 were discussed over the non-Tac radios. Other items of intelligence value were discussed at

various times during the exercise. e.g. names, rank, type of equipment, locations etc. OPSEC and items of intelligence value should be stressed to all non-Tac radio users.

IV. Ability To Survive and Operate (ATSO). Numerous ATSO events were created by the Inspection Team members to test the units reactions. These events were performed twice, once in the morning of the second day, and again in the afternoon. The events included Fuel Spill, MIJI, Bomb Threat, and attack by a small hostile force with chemicals. The following are comments provided by the Inspection Team members.

A. FUEL SPILL All necessary actions were performed. The cleanup procedure was slow, but it was methodical and thorough.

B. MIJI to ROF ROF performed all initial items very well. However, the CFP failed to notify the Supported Forces CC that this portion of his communications resources was not functional. The Supported Forces CC found out the system was out only after he tried to make a Phone Patch through the ROF. In addition, the move from the primary net frequency (the one being MIJI'd) to the net's secondary frequency was slow. The ROF did have a MIJI checklist and did use it throughout the ATSO event.

C. BOMB THREAT (morning) A simulated bomb was planted in the waste container just inside the CFP's entrance. It was discovered by one of the CFP personnel. The following are comments about the event as provided by the Inspection Team members.

1. CFP tent was evacuated within 30 seconds of the bombs discovery.
2. CFP failed to immediately notify nearby facilities.
3. CFP did not post a guard to keep all personnel out of the CFP area until the bomb was either defussed or exploded. Two people walked into the CFP during this timeframe to conduct normal business. They did not know a bomb had been found.
4. EOD was not called.
5. Numerous high risk intelligence materials were left in the CFP.
6. Bomb Threat Checklist was not fully utilized.
7. CFP personnel did stop a generator refueling operation in the immediate area of the CFP. The tanker was moved to a safe distance from the area.

D. BOMB THREAT (afternoon) A simulated bomb was planted in the Telephone switchboard area. The terrorist that planted the bomb then called the switchboard with the information that he had planted a bomb and it would explode in 10 minutes and

destroy the communications ability of the site. The operator passed this information to the CFP. The following comments are observations of the Inspection Team members.

1. Bomb threat information called in by the terrorist was not copied down verbatim by the operator that received it. This created some confusion as to where the bomb might be.

2. CFP did not immediately determine the bomb's possible location, so they directed an evacuation of all facilities.

3. CFP did not dispatch searchers to find the bomb for approximately six minutes. This was in spite of the fact that the caller said the bomb would go off in ten minutes.

4. CFP personnel did remove all key items needed to reestablish the CFP elsewhere if needed. Classified and high value intelligence items were removed from the CFP, or were provided adequate security.

D. ATTACK BY SMALL HOSTILE FORCE WITH CHEMICALS. There were two separate events staged. One in the morning another in the afternoon. All personnel on site participated in the morning one. Only those in the CFP participated in the afternoon event. The following comments about those events were compiled by the Inspection Team members. After each comment will be a notation indicating to which event the comment is associated.

1. CFP directed the Yellow Condition and performed a timely notification of all unit work centers. Morning and afternoon.

2. Duty officer correctly utilized DP personnel prior to going to Red Condition based on known intelligence data. Morning only.

3. When the unit was attacked the proper audible alarms were sounded under direction of CFP. However the intra facility alarm network failed to work properly in three facilities. The morning crew directed the repair of the system but did not check it out after maintenance fixed it. It failed again in the afternoon. Morning and afternoon.

4. DSTE Van was not notified of gas attack. Morning and afternoon.

5. CFP's post attack actions were correct. Morning only.

6. Inspectors noted numerous personnel that were not wearing NBC protective gear correctly and would have been casualties. Others donned their gear incorrectly. Morning only.

7. Some facilities failed to seal their facilities, simulated or otherwise. Morning only.

8. OPREP's and other required reports were not prepared and sent, simulated or otherwise. Morning and afternoon.

9. CFP personnel removed their gas masks too early during post attack period. Afternoon only.

10. Evacuation of base/site should not have been considered as an alternative. The attacking force was only twelve personnel strong, and some of them had been neutralized by base security forces. Afternoon only.

V. SAFETY The general attitude of the unit was good toward safety. Personnel were aware and knowledgeable of proper safety procedures, even though they did not always use that knowledge. The unit commander's attitude toward the safety program and it's implementation is superior, safety is one of his main unit priorities. During initial site set-up, safety was strongly emphasized. The following are comments provided by the Inspection Team members.

A. Personnel protective equipment was spotty to non-existent after the initial set-up was completed. Emphasis on gloves is needed.

B. Proper lifting and unloading procedures were not used. This needs to be emphasized to help prevent back injuries.

C. Hardhats were used by all crews during initial set-up.

D. Power production personnel used ear protection most of the time. There^{was} only a few noted instances of non-usage. Perhaps earplugs should be included in each generator package. Generator areas were not roped off until after initial set-up was complete.

E. Personnel used eye protection when hammering and driving stakes.

F. Vehicle safety was only fair to good. Drivers were observed backing vehicles without spotters and without wearing seatbelts. Some vehicles were parked without being chocked. Two generators were not chocked throughout the exercise. Unit checklists and OI's require every vehicle to be chocked when parked.

G. NOTE.. TRC-61 vans on ORI sites were operated without high voltage matting on the floors. Voltages used in the van are in excess of 600 volts. Safety mats are required IAW AFOSH 127-31. This is the most serious safety hazard noted during the exercise.

H. Initially, trip hazards were not marked. Wire maintenance did a very good job marking their wires.

I. Several Senior NCO's were approached about noted safety problems and a general "oh well" attitude was apparent with most of them. The safety program requires the support of all supervisory personnel to be effective. The reasons should be obvious, people function by example.

J. An additional duty Safety NCO had not been designated by the CFP until S+3 hours. This only after the CFP had been asked by one of the inspectors who the Safety NCO was.

K. Smoking near fuel tanker. Persons were seen smoking within the 50 ft radius of the tanker, one at about 10 feet. When approached and told to move away or put it out, the person ignored the instructions and commented "I didn't put the truck there".

L. The Security Burn Barrel for the DSTE was located underneath the CAMO netting without adequate clearance to prevent fire to the netting. No action was taken to remove the burn barrel.

M. Numerous fire extinguishers at the site are in need of repair, yearly weight checks, and recharging. This should be made a priority item upon return to home station.

N. Numerous ropes, stakes, and other items were left laying about, presenting potential trip hazards.

CIRCUIT EFFICIENCY LISTING

All Priority 1 and all but two of the Priority 2 circuits were up and in service within 24 hours

Average activation time for priority 1 circuits was 14 hours 7 minutes

The first priority 1 circuit to be activated was JUBVAM03, in 11 hours and 24 minutes.

The last priority 1 circuit to be activated was JUBVAM05 in 23 hours and 30 minutes.

Circuit breakdown of circuits activated in first 24 hours.

Circuit Activated Total time

AF-29	AM21	091405Z	12 hr	05 mins
	AM22	092020Z	18 hr	20 mins
	AM23	092050Z	18 hr	50 mins
	AM24	092109Z	19 hr	09 mins
AF-28-1	AM14	091537Z	13 hr	37 mins
	AM13	091828Z	16 hr	28 mins
8	AM04	090150Z	11 hr	50 mins
	AM02	091536Z	13 hr	36 mins
	AM01	082303Z	09 hr	03 mins
AF-27	AM06	100113Z	23 hr	13 mins
	AM03	090124Z	11 hr	24 mins
	AM05	100130Z	23 hr	30 mins



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS 142 FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR GROUP (ANG)
PORTLAND INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, OREGON 97218-2797

Supporting
Document No. 4

REPLY TO
ATTN OF 142 CSS/DPMUX

26 August 1985

SUBJECT 244 CISS Mobility Exercise, 5 Aug 85

TO 244 CISS/CC v 142 RMS/LGX 142 SPF/CC 142 CSS/JAG
244 CISS/LGX 142 Clinic/CC 142 RMS/CC 142 CSS/HC

1. The MPU was established at 0700 hrs, 5 Aug 85, in Bldg 748 for the purpose of a mobility exercise.

2. Two increments were scheduled to process:

Increment 1	MRRR To MPU	# Personnel Scheduled	# Personnel Processed	Sched Start	Sched Stop	Actual Start	Actual Stop
Sched	0800	20	15	0830	0900	0830	0937
Actual	0757						

Increment 2	MRRR To MPU	# Personnel Scheduled	# Personnel Processed	Sched Start	Sched Stop	Actual Start	Actual Stop
Sched	1030	60	55	1100	1245	1057	1147
Actual	1015						

3. Discrepancies by MPU Station: (Full personnel processing)

a. Station #1 - Eligibility - 5 vacancies in increment #1 and 5 vacancies in increment #2. The computer generated C.O.M.P.E.S. Mobility Requirement Resource Roster (MRRR) was not available due to Phase IV Computer conversion problems. A good facsimile was produced by the 244 CISS by a word processor and was used in the place of the MRRR C.O.M.P.E.S. product. Please identify discrepancies by Mobility Position Number (MPU) and unit name, not by individual's name and Social Security Number.

b. Station #2 - Clinic Station - There was one person, Jeff Anderson, medically disqualified because of Diabetic (Insulin) problem. Nine other shot discrepancies were noted. Please identify discrepancies by Mobility Position Number and unit name instead of individual's name and SSAN.

c. Station #3 - Emergency Data Station - Eleven Emergency Data (DD Fm 93) were accomplished. Six servicemens Group Life Insurance Forms (SGLI) were accomplished. Six unusual designee forms, for SGLI were accomplished also. Please identify discrepancies by Mobility Position Number (MPN) and unit name instead of individual's name and SSAN.

d. Station #4 - ID Card/Dog Tag Station - Six new ID Cards were accomplished and two new sets of dog tags were made. Please identify discrepancies by Mobility Position Number (MPN) and unit name instead of individuals name and SSAN.

e. Station #5 - Financial Data Station - Six people showed up at this station for processing without their Leave and Earnings Statements. Please identify discrepancies by Mobility Position Number (MPN) and unit name instead of individuals name and SSAN.

f. Station #6 - Legal Station did 3 legal consultations as needed. No discrepancies.

g. Station #7 - Chaplain Station - Eleven Religion changes were noted. Please identify discrepancies by Mobility Position Number (MPN) and not name and SSAN. Also note the unit i.e. 244 CISS.

h. Station #8 - Checkout Station - No discrepancies.

4. Critique: All stations performed their tasks well. However, station #4, ID Card/Dog Tag station, should scrutinize the dog tags closer. Station #7, Chaplain station identified 11 religion denomination changes and station #4 only-cut 2 new sets of dog tags!

a. Increment #1 had one person medically disqualified, Jeff Anderson, and his replacement D.D. Comstock took over 25 minutes to arrive at the MPU. Then he reaccomplished a new Emergency Data form, a new Servicemens Group Life Insurance and a new ID Card. The rest of Increment #1 was done with their processing by 0856 hrs, 4 minutes early, while having to wait for Jeff Anderson's replacement, D.D. Comstock, caused the whole increment to be 37 minutes late.

b. Increment #2 did much better than Increment #1 in their processing time, meeting both their start and finish times early.

5. Recommendations:

a. Suggest that personnel review their emergency data form (DD Fms 93), SGLI's, Dog Tags & ID Cards more often for their currency and correctness. This would speed up increment processing and help the unit meet the Mobility Schedule of Events for MPU processing.

b. Suggest that the 244 CISS provide the CBPO with a list by names, of what personnel they want loaded into their Mobility Requirements Resource Roster (MRRR) so we may produce a C.O.M.P.E.S. product for them.


BERNARD F. VERBOUT, Major, ORANG
Chief, CBPO

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
244 COMBAT COMMUNICATIONS SQUADRON (CONTINGENCY) (ANG)
PORTLAND INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, OREGON 97218 - 2797

Supporting
Document No. 5

REPLY TO
ATTN OF CC

18 Sep 85

SUBJECT Sep 85 UTA After Action Report

TO 252 CISG/CC

1. TASKED ACTIVITIES: Tasking is contained in the 85-9 unit Frag Order to 244 CISS OPLAN 600.

2. COMMUNICATION OPERATIONS:

a. Operation Time: The TGC-20 van was scheduled to operate unsecure from 1600Z to 2200Z on Saturday with the 244 CISF TGC-27 van. The actual operation time was from 2140Z to 2209Z. There was no operation time schedule for Sunday.

b. Problems: The reason for the excessively short actual operating time was due to a 244 CISF Tech Control Operating error. A loop back patch apparently went undetected for most of the day before it was corrected.

c. System Usage: Three narrative messages were originated and two were received.

d. Noncircuit Training:

(1) Radio Operation Training: Reconfigured UTC packages to be more practical for deployments. The section also completed CW training, Antenna Configuration training and Radiation training.

(2) DSTE Operator Training: The section performed Proficiency training in house.

3. MAINTENANCE:

a. Significant Items: The Quality Control section received a Staff Assistance Visit from the 252 CISG. Problems are as identified in the SAV report.

b. Maintenance Training:

(1) Ground Radio: The section reorganized UTC Teams and performed upgrade training.

(2) Quality Control: Material Deficiency Reports were accomplished and objective goals for the next CY86.

(3) Wideband: Extensive training was accomplished including Upgrade training in both 5 and 7 levels. Equipment to be deployed for the upcoming UTA was operationally checked and prepared.

c. N/A

4. SUPPORT ACTIVITIES:

- a. Recruiting and Retention: N/A
- b. UTA Attendance: Sat: 135; Sun: 129
- c. Logistics: N/A
- d. Medical: N/A
- e. Community Relations Activities: N/A

5. OTHER TRAINING ACCOMPLISHMENTS:

- a. Initial Mobility Training Class completed the Driver Training segment.
- b. The entire unit participated in a base parade honoring the retirement of General Charles A. Sams.

6. PROBLEM AREA IDENTIFICATION:

- a. Deficiencies: The Tech Control Operator error which caused a circuit outage resulted in 5 hours of lost training time for the Comm Center and Tech Control operators.
- b. Future problems of this nature can be avoided by the enforcement of proper operating procedures. The mini-Command Focal Point should be advised of all circuit outages and monitor circuit restoration.

7. Comments:

- a. The tasking of the parade and parade practice required much time which ordinarily is devoted to workcenter training.
- b. Lease Line checkout attachment not applicable.



KEITH E. HALLMARK, Lt Col, ORANG
Commander



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
244 COMBAT COMMUNICATIONS SQUADRON (CONTINGENCY) (ANG)
PORTLAND INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, OREGON 97218 - 2797

Supporting
Document No. 6

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: CC

8 Jul 85

SUBJECT: State Active Duty Status - Forest Fire Support

TO: TAG-OR/CCE

1. At approximately 1915 on 7 Jul 85 Lt Col Keith Hallmark was contacted by Ms. Julie Rodriguez of the Mt. Hood National Forest Supervisor's office to request the 244 CISS provide communications support for a forest fire that is currently being fought in the Mt. Hood National Forest. Lt Col Hallmark called Lt Col Opitz and Major Rowat of the Oregon Military Department to clear this request for support as per the 1976 written agreement. Lt Col Opitz and Major Rowat both concurred and the recall of technicians began.

2. The four communications sites to be supported are:

a. Mt Hood Forest Service Supervisor's office at 2955 NW Division, Gresham, OR.

b. Fire basecamp at Ripplebrook Ranger Station, OR.

c. Larch Mountain, OR (wideband relay site).

d. Whalehood Mountain, OR (wideband relay site).

3. Four wideband radio teams were deployed from Portland IAP at approximately 2330 on 7 Jul 85. Fifteen Air Technicians of the 244 CISS and 244 CISF were called out to support this request. Lt Col Hallmark is providing command and control at PIA and the other fourteen technicians are deployed to the sites. Current status of communications systems is 2 voice hotlines and 1 commercial dial line are operational from the Mt. Hood National Forest Service Supervisor's office in Gresham, OR to the fire basecamp at Ripplebrook Ranger Station, OR.

4. Lt Col Schwartz's office and the SPMO have been contacted regarding technician status and state active duty status procedures. A list of persons involved in this deployment is attached. This deployment will terminate when we are contacted by the Mt. Hood National Forest Supervisor's office that they no longer need our communications support.

FOR THE COMMANDER

Craig W. Hovey
CRAIG W. HOVEY, MSgt, ORANG
Admin/Personnel Supt

1 Attachment
Personnel List

cc: CC
142 FIG/CC
142 RMS/CC
TAG-OR/AGC
ATD/SPMO

Mt. Hood National Forest Fire Personnel List -

244 Combat Information Systems Squadron

Lt Col Keith E. Hallmark
CMSgt Leonard W. Norby
MSgt Robert H. Kehler
MSgt David A. Dowiasz
MSgt S. Parzy Rose III
TSgt Gary L. Chandler
TSgt James E. Jernstedt
SSgt William R. Nutter Jr.

244 Combat Information Systems Flight

Capt Franklin B. Noragon
SMSgt Ross E. Jacky
SMSgt Richard G. Ramey
MSgt Daniel D. Haider
MSgt Thelma Haneline Jr.
MSgt John W. Matzka
MSgt Steven P. Rose



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
244 COMBAT COMMUNICATIONS SQUADRON (CONTINGENCY) (ANG)
PORTLAND INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, OREGON 97218 - 2797

Supporting
Document No. 7

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: CC

26 July 1985

SUBJECT: State Active Duty Status - Forest Fire Support

TO: TAG-OR/CCE

1. At 1700, 25 July 85, MSgt Craig Hovey, 244 CISS Admin/Personnel Supv was contacted by Ms Julie Rodriguez of the Mt Hood National Forest to request support for a forest fire south east of Estacada in the vicinity of N. Fork Clackamas River. MSgt Hovey notified Duty Officer at Mil Dept in Salem, Lt Col Hallmark, unit commander, and initiated recall of technician fire teams.
2. The communications sites being supported are:
 - a. Mt Hood Forest Service Supervisor's Office, 2955 Division, Gresham, OR
 - b. Larch Mountain (Wideband Relay Site)
 - c. Goat Mountain
 - d. Bozo Fire Camp Estacada, OR
3. Four wideband radio teams were deployed from Portland IAP at approximately 2100, 25 Jul 85. Fifteen air technicians including one AGR of the 244 CISS and 244 CISF were called out to support this request. One team, originally deployed to Goat Mountain returned to PIA at approximately 1400, 26 Jul 85. The fourth team was determined to be unnecessary to the present situation.
4. All appropriate offices at PIA and the Military Dept have been contacted regarding this event. This deployment will terminate when we are notified by the Mt. Hood National Forest Supervisor's office that they no longer need our communications support.

FOR THE COMMANDER

Carolyn A. Wright
CAROLYN A. WRIGHT, TSgt, ORANG
Admin Tech

1 Attachment
Personnel List

cc: CC
142 FIG/CC
142 RMS/CC
TAG-OR/AROPT
ATD/SPMO

Mt Hood National Forest Fire Personnel List -

244 Combat Information Systems Squadron

Lt Col Keith E. Hallmark
SMSgt Joseph J. Buxton
SMSgt Richard P. DeMars
MSgt David A. Dowiasz
MSgt S. Parzy Rose II
TSgt Gary L. Chandler
TSgt James E. Jernstedt
SSgt William J. Nutter
MSgt Craig W. Hovey

244 Combat Information Systems Flight

Capt Franklin B. Noragon
SMSgt Ross E. Jacky
SMSgt Richard G. Ramey
MSgt Jerrold W. Lipps
MSgt John W. Matzka
MSgt Steven P. Rose